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Introduction 
The Brazilian insertion in the international system reflects the characteristics of a regional 
leader State seeking "autonomy through diversification" (Vigevani, 2007) to become a world 
player. After advancing social inclusion and poverty reduction programs in the past 20 
years, Brazil now seeks a new positioning in the 21st century international system. And for 
that, as an emerging, industrially developed country, it strives towards structuring and 
advancing its science, technology and innovation system in order to achieve an autonomous 
development capacity.    
Notwithstanding these tendencies, Brazil presents serious gaps in its public 
administration/public policy institutions and systems in terms of fundamental strategic 
matters of national defense and international security. This paper analyzes patterns in 
obtaining, absorbing and developing technology from major strategic defense projects, 
aimed at increasing Brazilian industrial-technological capabilities to conceive and develop 
defense products autonomously. This paper summarizes Transfer of Technology (ToT) 
policies and program outputs, intended outcomes, as well as results achieved so far, and the 
upcoming prospects and challenges of major defense projects. These considerations are 
partially drawn from research findings taking place at the Defense Policy Research Group 
at UFF.1 
The methodology selected was the use of case studies evaluation for two structuring 
research elements:  major interventions in defense programs and embedded ToT in the FX 
2 – Combat Aircraft Program (Gripen NG BR) and the PROSUB - Brazilian Navy Submarine 
Development Program. The ToT model was used to evaluate intended and preliminary 
                                                
1 I would like to thank participant members of the UFF-INEST Research Group Defense, Science & Technology and 
International Politics. I am thankful to Capes (Young Talents Program), PROPPI-UFF (CNPQ-PIBIC) and Faperj 
(PIBIC) for their scholarship grants and research support grants to members of this Group since 2012. Faperj has also 
sponsed Evert Vedung Course on Evaluation for this Research Group. 
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results of both programs, probing into major challenges and analyzing the implications for 
the Brazilian defense sector.  
 
 
1. Policy analysis and evaluation 
 
Policy studies began with careful scrutiny of the sequence of steps taken in the policy 
decision making process analyzed systematically by the pioneer work of Harold Laswell2. 
From the 1960s, policy analysis turned into policy advising to governments, influenced the 
public debate over issues, and even changed political power and influence configurations 
in many societies. Policy analysis addresses  
causes of public problems, alternative approaches to addressing them, the 
likely impacts of those alternatives, and the trade-offs that might emerge when 
considering appropriate governmental responses to the public problems 
(Mintrom and Williams, 2015, p 4). 
 
Policy evaluation is a mechanism for monitoring, systematizing information, and assigning 
value to government interventions (policies, organizations, programs, activities, etc.), their 
outputs (results from the decision-making phase), their outcomes (results after the 
implementation phase), or impacts and effects after intervention has been finalized (Vedung, 
1997, 2015, p 387 and Pedone, 1985).  
 In this sense, the analyses of defense programs in this paper will focus primarily on 
their outputs, the intended results deriving from decision making process, and the 
preliminary results of the ongoing implementation -- outcomes evaluated at an initial stage.3  
 
Evaluating Transfer of Technology (ToT) 
 
Barry Bozeman (2000) summarizes the discussion of Transfer of Technology, posing key 
questions for its effectiveness and criteria to measure it. Leaving out important points, 
Bozeman´s model chiefly focuses on domestic technology transfer from universities and 
                                                
2 LASSWELL Harold Dwight - The Decision Making Process, College Park, University of Maryland Press. 1956.   
3 Evert Vedung and Luiz Pedone – Course on Evaluation of Governmental Programs,  2013/2014/2015, Laboratorio 
Defesa&Polí tica[s]-UFF.  
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government laboratories to private firms, including some novelties such as political 
effectiveness and capacity building. 4  
For the purposes of this research, Bozeman’s model was modified to include two 
additional dimensions in addition to the issues of ToT: Human Capital Training and 
Economic Development.  One deals with the Democratic dimension, that is, the effects of 
ToT in defense programs on fostering democracy, the security of the population, and 
protection of natural resources in emerging democratic States like Brazil. The second 
includes an International Strategic dimension, particularly important in view of Brazil´s 
Strategic Partnership with developed countries – Sweden and France - in the two cases 
analyzed here. 5 
Therefore, our Modified Bozeman Model of analysis includes these major 
dimensions: 
 
1. Technology itself – “hardware” transfer of technology 
2. Economic development regional/ national 
3. State-Society fostering of democracy by defense modernization 
4. International Political Strategic Partnership 
5. The Human Capital Science & Technology “software” transfer 
 
To bring to stage the relevance of the programs adopted dealing with Transfer of 
Technology the following questions are offered: 
 
• What is the technology actually transferred to Brazil or adopted, and absorbed 
(changed, developed) in Brazil, the receiving country? Does it express the needs of 
the armed forces? Is it relevant to the Armed Forces? Does it solve the problems 
posed by strategic goals of the existing institutional framework (END -National 
Strategy of Defense, 2008; LBDN - White Book on National Defense, 2012)? 
• What are the effects on the national or regional economy, rather than on an individual 
firm?  What are the economic development implications, such as job creation or 
increase of income? What are the effects of formation of cluster of companies around 
                                                
4 BOZEMAN, Barry – Technology transfer and public policy: a review of research and theory.  Research Policy 29 
(2000), 627-655. See especially table 4, p. 638 and table 5, p. 645.  See discussion on Appendix.  
5 Discussions with Evert Vedung  
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major projects (S. José dos Campos, SP – Embraer and others, Itaguaí, RJ – Nuclep, 
ICN, DCNS, Marinha do Brasil and others)? 
• What are the State-Society effects from defense actions? Do defense policies and 
programs adopted by Brazil foster democracy? What is the effect on Brazilian society 
and the economy, and on its natural resources?  Are society and economy more 
protected in view of the technology obtained and absorbed through defense 
programs? 
• What are the international strategic advantages and disadvantages flowing from 
defense programs and their inherent ToT dimension? (geopolitical considerations) 
• What is the impact on Scientific and Technical Human Capital (from Bozeman´s 
criteria)?  Can we measure enhanced scientific and technical skills, technically 
relevant social capital, infrastructures (Networks, users-groups) supporting scientific 




Flows of Transfer of Technology   
 
Longo and Moreira (2012) cite the fact that many advanced countries’ governments or 
companies are not inclined to transfer power, effectively embedded in knowledge, thus 
leveraging technologically a future competitor in world affairs. Longo (2007) points out that 
particularly the United States has policies of  
limiting access to modern technology, making technology transfers incomplete in many 
cases. Similarly, Krause (1992, p 88), looking at economic factors and techonological 
endowments, determined first-tier states as centers of military production and innovation, 
leaving to second-tier and third-tier states respectively the roles of barely producing arms at 
the technological frontier or merely producing low-tech weaponry.  
Current globalization of the arms industry uses this stratification as an important 
analytical tool. Richard Bitzinger (2003) describes the second-tier producers such as Russia, 
India, Sweden, and Brazil, among others, as facing a challenge: cost increase and difficulties 
of qualitative or quantitative expansion for second-tier industries in view of high 
technological demands of manufacturing advanced weapons. Deficiencies remain at 
various levels: i) infrastructure of national science and technology; ii) R&D of advanced 
components, or its development or production. These shortages pose serious barriers to the 
development, absorption, and exploitation of technology for military use (Bitzinger, 2003, 
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p. 69) by identifying a number of adjustments in second-tier countries in which defense 
industries sought rationalization and globalization. Thus global production of weapons 
now happens where industry has become: a) smaller, with a declining number of 
manufacturers; b) more concentrated, through the consolidation of arms production in a few 
companies; and c) more integrated, due to the globalization process and the current 
transnational character of armaments production. Developing, emerging countries are part 
of this process. Increases in the intensity of cooperation agreements between emerging and 
developed nations reflect Bitzinger’s (2003) predictions. The technology transfer agreements 
are an important mechanism for the establishment of partnerships. The table below 
summarizes the three international flows of technology transfer: 
 
  Table 1: Three Flows of International Technology Transfer 
Flow A 
Knowledge 
(including that embodied 
in capital goods) 
Product Design / Specifications 
Materials / Components Specifications 
Process Design and Blueprints 
Production Procedures / Chronograms 
and Organization 
Flow B Know How 
Production / Organization Know How 
Operation / managing skills 
Maintenance skills and procedures 
Flow C Know Why 
Process / Production Design and 
Engineering, Know Why, Skills, 
Procedures and Experience 
Product / Market Design and 
Engineering Data Skills 
Project Management / Engineering 
Procedures and expertise 
Technology Development and Research 
skills, data procedures, etc.  
 LUCENA SILVA, A. H. and PEDONE, L. (2011) -  Adapted from Baark, E. (1997). - Military technology and 
absorptive capacity in China and India: implications for modernization. In Military Capacity and the Risk of War: 
China, India, Pakistan and Iran. (pp. 84-109). Oxford: Oxford University Press.  Apud TSAI. Ming-Yen, 2003. From 
Adversaries to Partners? Chinese and Russian Military Cooperation after the end of the Cold War.  Greewoog 
Publishing Group=Praeger. Westport, CT, 2003).  
 
The flows related to the production of knowledge and 
know-how “A” and “B” contribute to the capacity development of the recipient country in 
producing weapons. The flow "C", where important scientific knowledge principles and 
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engineering skills are passed along, can fundamentally contribute to the recipient country´s 
development of technological capabilities which lead to creating, designing, and producing weapons 
autonomously. These routes are legitimate ways to acquire technology through technical 
cooperation. Advanced first-tier countries will hardly make available technology flow of the 
type “C”, but it may be achieved through civil nature technologies agreements, which have 
implications for the military sector. Dual use technologies are a way to acquire knowledge 
for sensitive areas such as nuclear engineering and space science, which may have 
applications for military use. 
Brazilian National Strategy of Defense—a major defense policy—outlines that 
acquisition programs should include project manufacturing processes to offset national 
industry and even total control of weapons systems and integral transfer of technology.  
From these considerations emerges an ultimate, definitive criterion to evaluate ToT, 
appropriate for Brazil’s current strive to increase its international stance:  
 
development of technological and industrial capabilities for the autonomous design 
and production of weapons and defense systems. 
 
This coincides with Pavitt’s seminal contribution (1987) which shows a central concept of 
technology when he specified that technology is not simply an identification with science 
or with information. Technology is “specific, complex, partially tacit, and cumulative in its 
development” (Pavitt, 1987).  The same author proposes two central questions for analysis 
and later for the technology public policy process: 
 
1) That the nature and reach of the interaction between Science and Technology should 
be well defined;  
2) That accumulation occurs of technology knowledge firms, necessary not only for new 
and original inventions, but also for effective assimilation of technology developed 
elsewhere. (Pavitt, 1987) 
 
The important concept for Pavvitt is assimilation. As it is for Admiral Freitas: “Technology 
is not transferred: it is assimilated or created”. 6  
                                                
6 Admiral Elcio de Sá Freitas, A Busca da Grandeza: Marinha, tecnologia, desenvolvimento e defesa. Serviço de 
Documentação da Marinha, 2014. 479 p).   
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A list of Brazilian institutions, organizations and policies related to Transfer of 
Technology can be seen below depicting how the Armed Forces have generally treated the 
issue.  
 
Brazilian Institutional Framework for Transfer of Technology 
• Technology Transfer Contract -  INPI – National Institute of Industrial Property 
• COMAER (AIR FORCE COMMAND) –– Política de Compensação Comercial, Industrial e 
Tecnológica (Technological, Industrial and Commercial Compensation Policy), Diretriz do 
Comando da Aeronáutica (Directive of Air Force Command) 360-1, 2005  
• Brazilian Navy – Secretaria da Ciência, Tecnologia e Inovação da Marinha (Navy Secretary of 
Science, Technology and Innovation) -  Normas para a proteção da propriedade industrial 
na MB (Norms for ndustrial property protection). SecCTI – 401, 2014. Adopts Law of 
Industrial Property (LPI) n. 9279/14 May 1996.  
 
 
In addition, the institutional framwork regarding the defense sector has evolved in the past 
decades to include:  
 
Brazilian Institutional Framework regarding Defense 
• Política de Defesa Nacional – National Defense Policy - 1996 (FHC govt.) 
• Creation of Ministry of Defense – 1999 
• Regulatory Ordinance 764/2002 
• Política Nacional de Defesa – National Policy of Defense – 2005 (Lula govt.) 
• Estatégia Nacional de Defesa (END)– National Strategy of Defense – 2008. (Decree n. 
6703, 18 Dec. 2008) 
• Lei Complementar (LCP) n. 136, 25 Aug 2010 
• Special Tax for Defense Industry MP 544/2011 – tax incentives  
• Creation of SEPROD/MD – Secretariat for Defense Products, 2011 – acquisition of 
defense products and promotion of Science&Techology policies and R&D defense 
interests)  
• Law 12.598/2012 definig Defense Products and Strategic Defense Products 
• Livro Branco da Defesa Nacional (LBDN) –White book of National Defense, 2012 
• Estratégia Nacional de Defesa (END), Revisada – National Strategy of Defense 
Reviewed – 2012  
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1. Project FX-2 – SAAB-EMBRAER GRIPEN NG BR PROGRAM 
 
The project began as a renovation and modernization project FX under the Fernando 
Henrique Cardoso government after 2000 and 2001 visits to Brazil by the Swedish Minister 
of Defense, Björn von Sydow. After five years of negotiations, the project received a new 
scope in 2006 – FX-2 – including acquisition and development of 36-fourth and half 
generation New Generation NG fighters7 in substitution of the aging Mirage 2000, at the 
total cost of US$ 4.5 billion.  
FX-2 Program – Acquisition of Combat Fighters - encompassed a profound change 
starting with the requirement of complete Transfer of Technology (ToT), and the rights to 
production under license in Brazil and exporting to the South American market. This goal 
was established in the National Strategy of Defense (END, 2008) aiming at improving skills 
and capabilities to manufacture and to maintain fighter jets in Brazil: “Not only refers to the 
[...] logistic cost of acquisition [...] but also the cost of the life cycle.”8 This is why the Air 
Force hinged upon ToT and industrial cooperation, trying to guarantee in the long run 
autonomy of manufacturing and operating weapons systems.  
Three suppliers were short-listed in the FX-2 Program after 2008: USA´s Boeing F/A-
18 E/F Super Hornet, the French Dassault Rafale, and the Swedish SAAB JAS-39 Gripen. 
After announcing a pre-decision with the French Government in September 2009, Brazilian 
president Lula had to retreat after a Report9 from the High Command of Aeronautics was 
delivered in December 2009 showing clear advantages of the Swedish aircraft:  
 
a) final costs and maintenance costs (circa half of French Rafale), at US$ 130 
million;  
                                                
7 A number of these will be jointly developed as the JAS 39 Gripen NG, standing for New Generation, possibly a fifth-
generation fighter. 
8 Brigadeiro do Ar José Augusto Crepaldi Affonso, President of the Coordinating Commission of the Combat Aircraft 
(Comissão Coordenadora do Programa Aeronave de Combate, COPAC) - “Projetos estratégicos das Forças Armadas: 
uma contribuição para o desenvolvimento “ 6 May 2014, Chamber of Deputies / Commision of Foreign Relations and 
National Defense, CREDN – Short Hand Notes,  p 6.  
Gripen NG – O voo mais alto do Brasil  - SAAB  Federal Senate Public Audience. Commission of Foreign Relations 
and National Defense. 11 August 2011. Available at  
www.senado.leg.br/comissoes/cre/ap/AP_20110821_Bengt_Janer.pdf. Access 27 March 2015.  
9 Eliane Catanhêde - FAB prefere caça sueco a francês. Poder Aéreo, 5 January 2010.  Available at 
http://www.aereo.jor.br/2010/01/05/fab-prefere-caca-sueco-a-frances/ ;    
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b) assurance of delivery of 100% technology transfer solicited by Brazilian Air Force 
(FAB); 
c) assurance of delivery of 100% of technologies asked for by major aeronautics 
enterprises in Brazil, mainly Embraer;  
d) Transfer process – “On Job Training”, design/engineering project learning process  
 
In December 2013, a decision favorable to Gripen was taken after the unveiling of 
spying actions on Brazilian president Dilma Roussef, high officials, and the Brazilian oil 
company, Petrobrás. With this decision, it was also announced that at least 40% of the 
aircraft would be built in Brazil.  Former Defense minister Celso Amorim stated: 
“The choice, everyone knows, was the result of studies and careful appraisal, 
taking into account performance, effective technology transfer and costs, not 
only acquisition but also maintenance. The choice was based on the best 
equilibrium of these 3 factors” [“A escolha, que todos sabem, foi objeto de 
estudos e ponderação muito cuidadosa, levou em conta performance, 
transferência efetiva de tecnologia e custo, não só de aquisição, mas de 
manutenção. A escolha se baseou no melhor equilíbrio desses três fatores.”] 10 
Some additional reasons for choosing Sweden´s Gripen instead of French or American 
fighters:  
 
1) High price of French fighter Rafale;  
2) Sarkozy opposed Lula and his proposal of Iran´s nuclear fuel exchange in the 
negotiation advanced by Brazil and Turkey in 2010;   
3) France supported the United Kingdom in voting against the Brazilian Roberto 
Azevedo to the presidency of the World Trade Organization in May 2013;  
4) All negotiations which took place after President Obama’s11 visit to Brazil to 
improve US-Brazil defense cooperation unraveled due to spying activities 
announced by journalist Glenn Greenwald based on documents leaked by Edward 
Snowden (former NSA-US).  
                                                
10 Poder Aéreo – Celso Amorim acaba de confirmar: Gripen NG é o novo caça da FAB. Available at 
http://www.aereo.jor.br/2013/12/18/celso-amorim-acaba-de-confirmar-gripen-ng-e-o-novo-caca-da-fab/18 dezembro 
2013, Access, 20 December 2013. 
11 Defense Secretary Leon Panetta and Vice President Jow Biden accompanied and met with high defense officials.  
Pedone, Luiz. Science, technology and innovation for defense in Brazil- An Analysis of the Transfer of Technology and 
Challenges of Brazilian Defense Porgrams. 
 





Although these are important reasons, what was paramount among principal stakeholders 
— the High Command of Aeronautics and the Brazilian aerospace industry—was the 
assurance of technology transfer.  The domain over arms systems, partnership with 
Brazilian firms, technical-operational cooperation agreement and ToT to increase Brazilian 
capacities to produce parts of the aircraft in the country were preponderant reasons for the 
Gripen choice.  
Final financial agreements between SAAB and the Brazilian Air Force /Brazilian 
Government were recently made in the Stockholm/Linköping State visit by Dilma Roussef. 
The Swedish Export Credit Agency put together a credit deal of US $ 4.7 billion at 2.54% 
rate totaling SEK 39.7 billion taken by SAAB as order for 36 aircraft to be manufactured in 
cooperation with Brazilian Embraer and its associated companies.  
We will now turn to the preliminary evaluation of the 5 dimensions posed in the 
Evaluation of Transfer of Technology section ( p 5-6).   
 
 Technology itself – “hardware” – Transfer of Technology  
Transfer of technology and industrial cooperation in the Gripen NG BR Program signed 
between SAAB and the Brazilian Airforce is a paramount dimension to evaluate in the 
current context.  Although circa 66 offset contracts are still in negotiations this year,12 
EMBRAER Defesa & Segurança, the major company in Brazil for producing the fighter jet 
will also be responsible for absorbing technology transferred, adapting, modifying, and 
possibly creating during the process. The intended unrestricted ToT includes arms codes 
allowing for integration of new systems autonomously developed in Brazil.  
AKÆR Engenharia, a Norwegian engineering company located in Brazil, has 
participated in the Gripen NG project since 2009. It was contracted to design central and 
rear fuselage, wings, door of landing gear and producing under Transfer of Technology 
agreement with SAAB even before the Brazilian government’s decision in favor of SAAB 
JAS-39 Gripen. 
ATECH – Negócios em Tecnologia S/A, a subsidiary of Embraer, is a leading 
specialized firm in information technology, systems of systems, command&control, air 
                                                
12 http://www.infodefesa.com./latam/2015/06/15/noticia-brasil-desenvolveu-projetos-offset-compra-gripen-.html.   
Access 27 July 2015.  
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traffic control/ instruments and control/ surveillance systems responsible for ToT 
management and new technologies management. 
MECTRON – missile and high-tech products manufacturer (A-Darter, Piranha, 
radars, satellite equipment dual use) was bought by Odebrecht Defesa e Tecnologia, in 2011, 
for BRL$ 100 million (reais).  It will be responsible for the air-air missile A-Darter systems 
to be installed in the Gripen. It has been involved in developing this missile with South 
Africa in the recent past.    
EMBRAER Defesa & Segurança associated with AEL Sistemas S/A (Aeroeletronica), 
an engineering firm connected to Israel´s Elbit Systems Ltd., will be in charge of design and 
manufacturing of advanced displays and software and computer technologies avionics to 
the Gripen NG or Gripen E èBR (a 4.5th generation fighter jet). In addition, Selex, GE Brasil 
will jointly with Embraer develop products and subsystems for the Combat plane in Brazil.  
Wings, fuselage segments, doors made by Brazilian companies are going to equip all 
Gripen E or NG, included those manufactured in Sweden. This means that Sweden, with a 
long-time tradition of military independence, for the first time in history will trust to another 
country part of its most important defense weapon, different from what happened in South 
Africa. Avionics, embarked software, will be jointly developed with Embraer and the 
national industry will have complete technological domain of software and arms systems. 
Planning and organization (Logistics) of the complex program will supported by Brazilian 
companies. Additionally, intellectual rights will be shared with national companies.  This 
was reason enough for Dan Jangblad´s (SAAB Senior Vice President) statement during his 
visit to S. Bernardo to launch SBTA US$ 150 million investment: “Because of this, value of 
ToT is more than 100% of the value of the contract of US$ 4.5 billion”, he said.13 
 
 
Intended Hardware Transfer 
a. process and production design for wings, center and rear fuselage, door of 
landing gear 
b. control systems 
c. production procedures and  organization  
d. R&D technology data 
 
 
                                                
13 Available at http://www.aereo.jor.br/2014/01/31/caca-gripen-da-saab-tera-versao-com-dois-assentos.  Access 23 May 
2014.  
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Economic development, regional or national   
 
Regarding economic development, regional or national, SAAB and Inbrafiltro Group are 
expected to invest US$ 150 million in São Bernardo Tecnologia Aeroespacial (SBTA), located 
in a 40.000 m2 site, for building the aerostructure factory. Equity participation in this 
endeavor accounted for 60% by Brazilian Inbrafiltro Group, and 40% by SAAB. This São 
Bernardo do Campo plant is part of the supply chain for Gripen and can be considered a 
major additional commitment on the original offset package (with Akær, 2009). Structural 
parts of the aircraft (fuselage, front and rear wings) will be made in São Bernardo then 
shipped to Embraer´s Gavião Peixoto plant or to SAAB Linköping plant for final assembly.  
According to SAAB CEO Håkan Buskhe this company is expected to hire 1,000 
professionals:  
 
 It means we will transfer all that allows Brazil to develop its next generation 
of military jets. We will work with a huge range of Brazilian companies, 
including Embraer and Akaer and I believe that 80% of the order of 36 fighters 
may be totally fabricated on Brazilian soil. Our plan is that your country 
becomes an export base of Gripen - we are building a factory in São Bernardo 
do Campo which is part of this project, and there will be others, certainly. 
Depending on the success of the contract, we will create thousands of jobs. 14 
 
Since this investment was postponed because the delivery of the aircraft has been delayed 
to 2019, Inbrafiltro started production of composite material (plastic, carbon fiber) for wings 
and landing gear lid in its Mauá production complex.15 
As for national development and international trade, according Celso Amorim, Brazil 
should have rights to commercialization with Latin American & other developing countries 
with which Brazil holds close bilateral ties, including defense relationships. Argentina has 
demonstrated interest in hosting Gripen, at which the United Kingdom immediately balked 
last November 2014.  A world market of 5,000 fighter aircrafts is predicted for 2034. A SAAB 
                                                
14 Sheila Silva – Após a assinatura do contrato FX2 encara seu maior desafio. 
http://www.defesabr.com/blog/index.php/16/11/2014/apos-assinatura-do-contrato-f-x2-encara-seu-maior-desafio/. 
Access in 17 June 2015.  
15  Leone Farias - Partes do Gripen serão feitas em Mauá. Diário do Grande ABC. 
http://www.fab.mil.br/notimp/mostra/16-04-2015#n88025. Access 17 June 2015.  
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high official declared that SAAB-Embraer sales can reach from 6 to 9 percent (300 to 450 
units) in this world market, summing a US$ 45 Billion income at US$ 100 million each 
aircraft.16  
 In the past ten years, the increase of defense production and correspondent offset 
agreement signed by the Brazilian Air Force (FAB) already generated US$ 1 billion for the 
industry located in Brazil in purchases of military equipment or civilian products. This is 
currently regulated by the Regulatory Ordenance n˚ 764 / MD (27 December 2002) which 
established for every military purchase above US$ 5 million the obligation of an offset clause. 
The Brazilian Air Force Command expanded the general compensation clause of 2002 by 
stating that offset is defined as “each and every compensatory practice negotiated between 
the parties, as a condition for the import of goods and / or services with the intent of 
generating benefits of commercial, industrial and technological nature to the buyer.” (DCA 
360-1, 13th Dec. 2005)  
 With more than sixty contracts being negotiated, future investment planned can 
reach a total of BRL$ 10 billion and can cause problems for companies. Current legislation 
only covers the reception of technologies, products and processes to companies in Brazil. It 
must be adapted to the role of Brazilian companies as exporters of technologies creating 
international markets favoring export and trade. 17 
 
State-Society fostering of democracy by defense modernization 
 
Democratic (and non-democratic, for that matter) countries strive for protecting their 
territory, population and economy, including natural resources.  Contemporary thought for 
security means seeking financial, food, energy, and political-military autonomy. 18   
Democracy is a value introduced in the first lines of National Strategy of Defense 
stating Brazil is a pacific country, and guides its international relations by non-intervention, 
defense of peace, peaceful conflict resolution and democracy. (END, 2012, p. 1)  
                                                
16 Diario do Grande ABC, 16 November 2014 - Saab prevê mercado de US$ 45 bi. (Sonia Braulio Pedrozo interview with 
vice president of Industrial Partnership-SAAB Aeronautics, Jan Germundsson. 
http://www.dgabc.com.br/Noticia/1056597/saab-preve-mercado-de-us$-45-bi. Access in 17 June 2015. 
 
17 Valor Econômico – Virginia Silveira – Transferência de Tecnologia gera US$ 1 bi. 17/09/2014 
18 See Wellington Dantas Amorim - O DRAGÃO, A RAPOSA E O TETRAEDRO DO PODER: 
China, Japão e o Equilíbrio de Autonomias. PhD Dissertation Political Science. Universidade Federal Fluminense, 2014.  
Pedone, Luiz. Science, technology and innovation for defense in Brazil- An Analysis of the Transfer of Technology and 
Challenges of Brazilian Defense Porgrams. 
 




Modernization of defense equipment acquisitions with Transfer of Technology are a 
means of seeking political-military autonomy, therefore making the country capable of 
defending and fostering democracy. Brazil´s National Objectives of Defense stated in the 
National Policy of Defense (PND, 2005) have as a first paramount objective guaranteeing 
sovereignty, national assets and territorial integrity.  
Besides the political benefits directed to the Brazilian society this Gripen NG BR 
Program is aimed at restoring Brazilian Air Force defense capabilities according to END 
(2008, 2012) and White Book of National Defense (LBDN, 2012) directives, with an important 
component of autonomous development of aerospace defense industry in the country.  
 
International Political Strategic Partnership – Sweden-Brazil 
 
In October 2014, a contract was signed between SAAB and the Brazilian Air Force to build 
28 single seat fighters, of which 15 were to be built in Brazil, plus 8 double seat fighters. It 
includes logistical support, furnishing of spare parts, training and industrial cooperation 
program for Transfer of Technology, and purchase of arms systems. Later, FAB announced 
the intention of purchasing a total of 108 Gripen in the future, 72 more than originally 
announced. 19 The Gripen New Generation double seat version is intended to be entirely 
developed by the Brazilian industry in cooperation with SAAB. 
This strategic cooperation has the intended outcome of increased access to all levels 
of technology including Gripen Source code, hardware integration, avionics, software and 
aircraft systems, in addition to the Human Capital “software”, that is the training and 
learning processes for 350-plus Brazilian engineers and other professionals in Sweden. 
Months before (April 2014) SAAB and Embraer had signed a Memorandum of 
Understanding initiating an industrial cooperation program for direct compensations of 
intellectual property rights and technological capacity for production.  
This will contribute to make possible production of the aircraft on the medium and 
long run by the national industry of defense. Industrial policies and programs contained in 
the National Strategy of Defense (Estratégia Nacional de Defesa, END) have a more permanent 
                                                
19 A senior High Air Force official announced Brazil intention to acquire 108 Gripen Next Generation at the Flightglobal 
– Internation Fighter Conference, London, UK . Available at   http://www.airforce-technology.com/news/newsbrazilian-
air-force-plans-to-purchase-108-gripen-ng-fighters-4444568 20 november 2014. Access 09.08.2015. 
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objective of modernizing and capacitating Brazilian aerospace industry in the long run (30-
40 years) not only for national defense but also to supply the needs of South American 
countries’ Air Force programs.   
 
Figure 1-  Gripen Subsystems by Country of Origin 
 
 
Source: http://www.brasilemdefesa.com/2015/01/gripen-ng-saab.html . Access 06 February 2015.   
 
While Sweden seems to believe Brazilian authorities are trustworthy for Transfer 
Technology, it is important to remember that many Gripen systems are not Swedish in 
origin (engine from General Electric-US, AESA radar by Selex-EX-United Kingdom and so 
forth), which leaves Brazil vulnerable to technological blockage and/or interferences from 
other countries with a known bad-will to transfer sensitive technology. (See above figure 
showing array of countries supplying different Gripen parts and systems.)  
When Sweden joined the European Union in 1995, many successful Swedish defense 
and security policies were downloaded to the EU for peace and security, both regionally and 
worldwide. Concepts such as Crisis Management were an important Swedish contribution 
while participating in the Balkans conflict under the Partnership for Peace (PfP, NATO) even 
without being a member of this organization, and later in other Peace Operations. Sweden´s 
prominence in technological innovation was key to its defense industry to merge and 
associate with other European defense firms. The same occurs in its internationalization of 
production policy to South Africa, India, and Brazil, reaffirming its capacity to adapt to a 
new geopolitical and geo-economics defense map. 
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This Sweden-Brazil strategic partnership contributes to our country´s goals of 
increased protection of Brazilian interests (Amazon, South Atlantic, Blue Amazon) as well 
as contributing to international peace and security (Middle East, Mediterranean Sea, 
Caribbean). Brazil, just like Sweden, is preparing for new needs emerging from the 
geopolitical realities of the 21st century.  
 
Human Capital Science & Technology “software” Transfer 
 
This dimension is probably even more important than “hardware” transfer of technology 
mentioned in the first dimension. This is the know how dimension of technology transfer. 
Here we deal with capabilities transferred in terms of design and creation of engineering 
solutions, production engineering data skills, process and product design and engineering 
procedures and experiences leading to technology innovation. (See Fig 1 Three Flows of 
International Technology Transfer, p. 7) 
This Gripen NG BR Program is sending 357 Brazilian aeronautical and defense 
industry engineers to develop Gripen NG in Linköping.  This is done through formation, 
specialization and On Job Training transfer of knowledge. Development, production and 
assembly of the aircraft will be coordinated by Embraer in Brazil (240 engineers).  This 
complex work is jointly developed with SAAB/Sweden, Inbrafiltro Group (43 
professionals), AEL Sistemas (8 professionals), Akær (7 professionals), Atech (26 
professionals), Mectron (12 professionals). 20 
   In addition to these long / short term courses, internship training, and organizing 
data bases, On Job Training is a “hands on” project, developing and putting together the first 
8 fighters built in Sweden by Brazilians and 15 fighters built in Brazil.  Twenty-one military 
specialists from the DCTA – Department of Airspace Science and Technology/ Command 
of Aeronautics (COMAER) are accompanying all of the processes, supervising and 
evaluating ToT. All these engineers, professionals and specialists will be working in Sweden 
between 2015 and 2021, from development, prototype testing and manufacturing the 
aircrafts.  From the initial 36 planes, 13 will be built by Swedes, 8 by Brazilians in Linköping 
                                                
20 http://www.infodefensa.com/latam/2015/06/15/noticia-brasil-desenvolveu-projetos-offset-compra-gripen.html. 
Access in 27 June 2015.  See also  
http://www.defesaaereanaval.com.br/governo-mantem-recursos-para-o-kc-390-e-o-gripen. Access 27 June 2015 
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and 15 in Brazil.  Brazilian Air Force will receive these from the beginning of 2019 through 
2024.21 
  
4. Brazilian Navy Strategic Programs   
 
Blue Amazon and Strategic Projects 
The Blue Amazon (Amazonia Azul) concept was introduced in view of the UN Convention 
on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) to guarantee Brazilian control of a maritime territory of 
4.4 million km2, equivalent to half of the land Brazilian territory or the “Green Amazon”.  
This extensive maritime theater (of operations), where 95% of Brazil´s foreign trade fleet 
navigate, more than 40 ports hold import/export activities. Offshore oil exploration and 
production has become paramount for the Brazilian economy (13% of GDP) since, 
particularly after the finding of a Pre-Salt layer, increasing daily production to 
approximately 2.8 million barrels per day (800 thousand barrels per day coming from 
Campos and Santos Pré-Salt fields). In addition to fishing, exploration of rare natural 
resources (nickel, copper, cobalt) is yet to be fully undertaken. Brazilian state intervention 
to protect this wealth was to develop policies and programs related to sea defense, spelled 




Table 2 - Brazilian Navy major strategic programs 
Projects Period Estimated Total Value up to 
2031 (Million of Reais) 
PNM – Navy Nuclear 
Program  
1979-2031  4,199.00 




                                                
21 Air Brigadier José Augusto Crepaldi Afonso (11 June 2015)fab.mil.br/noticias/mostra/22282/GRIPEN-NG— - 
Brasil-receberá-9,1-bilhões-de-dólares-em-projetos-de-compensação. Access 20 Aug 2015.  
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d) 4 Barroso Frigates 
e) NPa 500 Ton 
f) PROANF 
 
Recovery of Operational 
Capacity 
2009-2025 5,372.30 
SisGAAz – Management 
System for Blue Amazon 
2013-2024 12,095.60 
2nd Fleet Naval Complex / 
2nd Marine force of the Fleet 
2013-2031 9,141.50 
Safety in Navigation 2012-2031    632.80 
Personnel 2010-2031 5,015.60 
 
Source: Federal Senate – Commission of Science and Technology - Presentation by the Secretary of Science, 
Technology and Innovation of the Navy, 2013.  
 
This paper will focus on the two large-scale projects paramount to the Brazilian Navy by 
reason of involving scientific and technological development with transfer of technology, 




Navy Nuclear Program 
 
Initiated in 1979, this program developed totally under control of the Brazilian Navy Center 
of Technology of the Navy at the University of São Paulo (Centro de Tecnologia da Marinha na 
USP, CTMSP) to control and develop autonomous nuclear technology in major areas:  
 
1) Program development of a Nuclear Propulsion Reactor 
2) Nuclear Fuel Cycle Development Program  
  
Major accomplishments include:  
2007-08 – President Lula’s visit to ARAMAR reinitiates a dragging program (by “fits and 
starts”) in a different financing level “US$ 2.57 billion to overcome deterioration of Navy 
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material and restart Navy Strategic Project.”22 To start, construction of two uranium 
enrichment plants and construction of adequate installation for LABGENE (Laboratory for 
Nucleoelectric Generation) and assembly of the pressure vase and internal components of a 
prototype reactor for the future nuclear propelled submarine were authorized.  
2009-2010 -   Brazil and France signed the Strategic Partnership Agreement in December 
2008 to seal a rapprochement between the two countries. Brazilian geopolitics and geo-
economics of defense included protection of the Amazon and South Atlantic natural 
resources. It included the sales/production of 50 helicopters and 4 conventional submarines 
and the hull of nuclear propelled submarine (at a cost estimated at € 5.6 billion with DCNS 
-Direction des Constructions Navales et Services). This was done on the wake of France´s 
support for Brazilian president Lula’s rising strategic positioning in the world and search 
for a greater protagonist stance in world politics, including Brazilian aspiration to a 
permanent UN Security Council seat.  
  
2012 - Inauguration of first of 4 plants of Unit Production of Uranium Hexafluoride (USEXA) 
and construction of the Center of Nuclear Instruction and Training ARAMAR (CIANA) by 
the end of 2012.  
 
 
PROSUB-Submarine Development Program (4 S-Br + 1 SSN) 
 
The final objective of the PROSUB- Submarine Development Program (Programa de 
Desenvolvimento de Submarinos) is to make the Brazilian Navy capable of monitoring the 
South Atlantic and guaranteeing conditions for Brazilian sovereignty and protection of 
natural resources and of commercial routes.  The program is a result of the Strategic 
Partnership signed between France and Brazil in 2008. The program intended outcomes are 
the construction of 4 conventional submarines (Class Scorpene), and a nuclear-propelled 
submarine, allowing Brazil to join a small nuclear submarines club (US, China, Russia, 
France, United Kingdom and India) in the future.  
                                                
22 João Roberto Martins Filho – O projeto do submarino nuclear brasileiro. Contexto Internacional, vol 33 no 2 
July/Dec 2011. 
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Admiral Roberto Gondim – Diretoria de Gestão de Programas Estratégicos da Marinha. 
Presentation, 2 Oct 2015. Inest-UFF. 
 
To accomplish this complex objective, which includes designing and constructing 
conventional and nuclear propelled submarines in Brazil, it was necessary to build the 
Constructions Shipyard, a modern Naval Base (completed in December 2014), a Fabrication 
Unit of Metallic Structures (UFEM, completed in 2012), as well as the Maintenance Shipyard 
(expected for 2018) and the Radiological Complex (planned for 2024).  These main goals 
were established in a series of documents, policy instruments and policy and program 
interventions as follows: 
- Strategic Partnership signed by Lula and Sarkozy;  
- Agreement signed by the Brazilian and French ministers of Defense; 
- Technical Arrangements between Brazil´s and France´s ministries of Defense and 
signed by the Brazilian Navy Commander and the Chief of Staff of the French Navy;  
-  Contract between Consortium Baía de Sepetiba (CBS) comprising DCNS (Direction 
des Constructions Navales et Services), Construtora Norberto Odebrecht and Itaguaí 
Construções Navais (ICN) [ICN is composed by Odebrecht Defesa e Tecnologia (59% 
of equity) and by the French Direction des Constructions Navales et Services – DCNS 
(41% of equity)] where the Brazilian Navy has a Golden Share (1%) with veto power 
over decisions. 
2012 - Construction of UFEM - Fabrication Unit of Metallic Structures (Unidade Fabricação de 
Estruturas Metalicas) complementary heavy engineering industrial plant nearby NUCLEP, 
Nuclebras Equipamentos Pesados.  NUCLEP was built in the 1980s for manufacturing 
Conventional Submarines 
 
S40 Riachuelo 2nd Semester 2018 
S41 Humaitá 1st Semester 2020 
S42 Tonelero 2nd Semester 2021 
S43 Angostura 1st Semester 2022 
Nuclear Propelled Submarine 
SN-BR Alvaro Alberto SN10 
 
July 2025 
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metallic equipment of nuclear power plants planned in the 1975 Nuclear Accord with 
Germany, and holds German technology for conventional submarine construction and 
pressure vase construction. 
EBN - Naval Base and Shipyard (Estaleiro e Base Naval) – where assembly, launching, 
operation and maintenance of submarines will take place.  More than 600 companies are 
involved in the construction of UFEM and EBN.  
 We now turn to the 5 dimensions of Transfer of Technology posed in the Evaluation 
of Transfer of Technology.  
 
 
Technology itself – “hardware” – Transfer of Technology  
 
Intended “Hardware” technology transferred in this program include project development, 
construction employing computerized systems (CADS), combat systems development, 
platform (submarine) control systems development, automated control systems 
development, maintenance of missiles, maintenance of periscopes (including optronics 
periscope), and construction of the main electric motor.  
 DCNS (Direction de Constructions Navales e Services) delivered civil engineering 
projects and document specifications for the construction of UFEM - Fabrication Unit of 
Metallic Structures, and EBN – Construction Shipyard and Naval Base, in the State of Rio 
de Janeiro.  
 
Nationalization Plan (Subcontract 3 of Offset Contract n. 8)  
One hundred and four projects related to main systems, equipment and items of both 
conventional and nuclear-propelled submarines are candidates to be “nationalized”, in 
other words, be made in Brazil. The current situation (November 2015) is the qualification 
of companies capable of making 54 priority projects including batteries, main electric motor, 
electric engines, electric panels, air compressors, combat systems, torpedoes tubes, bearings, 
battery monitoring systems, compression hull valves, water pumps, and more.23  Just this 
                                                
23 MARINHA DO BRASIL, Diretoria Geral do Material da Marinha, Contrato 8 – Offset, Serviço de Informação ao 
Cidadão da Marinha do Brasil, 2015; interview with Diretor General Management of Strategic Projects of the Navy, 2015, 
in BERRIEL, Guilherme, 2016. 
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subcontract involved ToT in the production of systems and equipments, training for the 
development and integration of systems software, and technical support for Brazilian 
enterprises during the manufacturing of products.  
Contract number 8 of COGESN (General Coordination of Development of Submarine 
with Nuclear Propulsion) refers to offset of the PROSUB in 21 compensation operations to 
Brazil and to the Brazilian Navy with respect to imports done through Direction des 
Constructions Navales et Services (DCNS). Brazilian engineers and project designers were sent 
to France to absorb know how/know why: 
 
- 19 operations directly related to conception, operation and maintenance of 4 S-BR 
and SN-BR 
- 2 Technical Assistance operations a) maintenance of equipment & systems of NAe -
Aircraft Carrier São Paulo; and b) modernization of AMRJ – Navy Arsenal Rio de 
Janeiro. 
- 18 directly related to ToT – theoretical and practical training; professional formation 
courses (On Job Training), assistance from DCNS and technical documentation 
blueprints.  
- Total € 500 million euros in knowledge and capabilities to be incorporated to the 
country. 
 
From the summary of the process of ToT on PROSUB we find an ambitious goal of 
obtaining a maximum index of nationalization of products, with subsystems made in Brazil. 
However, the majority of the companies involved “are subsidiaries of multinational firms 
created to manufacture submarine components” (TCU Report, 2013, p. 44). 
Nationalization intends to qualify productive chains to supply parts, equipments, 
and systems for conventional and nuclear submarines construction, including “an offset of € 
400 million to increase capabilities of enterprises to absorb ToT (know-how, know-why) 
which will result in purchases of € 100 million internally. Ninety-four sub-projects will be 
done by the Brazilian Navy and DCNS certified companies (200 companies were visited), 
sixteen of the twenty more important certified supply companies of PROSUB are 
subsidiaries of foreign companies:  Adelco, Atech, Axima do Brasil, Bardella, Cecal, 
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Cilgastech, Datapool, Ensival Moret do Brasil, J&F, Howden, Mectron, Omnisys, Pall do 
Brasil, Qualiferr, Sacor, Schneider do Brasil, Termomecânica, Usilider, WEG e Zollern. 
 
Table 4 - Nationalization Plan 
Contract Blueprints and 
Engineering 
Specifications 
Recycling and  
Formation 










Structures  and  
 




UFEM –  254 groups of 
documents for civil 
engineering project and 
83 group of documents 
for equipment specs. 
EBN – 175 group of 
documents for civil 
engineering project and 
83 group of documents 
for Equipment 
specification 
Furnished by DCNS 









































in production and 
maintenance of 
equipment and 
systems of these 
submarines 
 
Offset – ToT and Know-
How  
104 subprojects 
Brazilian Navy has 
given priority to 56 
subprojects systems, 
equipment  or items 







visited – to 
become 
suppliers of the  
subprojects. 
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From: Serviço de Informação ao Cidadão da Marinha do Brasil ( Pedido de Informação NUP 60502.00698/2015-
29 ) – Resumo do Processo de TdT, 8 páginas.  
 
 
Economic development, regional or national   
 
The Submarine Development Program – PROSUB already spent circa BRL$ 10 billion reais 
–in the construction of UFEM, EBN, and a myriad of complex activities leading to the 
construction of 4 conventional S-BR and 1 SN-BR. These first actions have yielded income 
to Odebrecht Defesa e Tecnologia, a major partner at Itaguai Construções Navais, ICN (with 
DCNS e the Brazilian Navy, MB) of about BRL$ 104 billion in the year of 2014.24  Economic 
development can also be measured by the direct employment of 13,650 technicians and 





                                                
24 Odebrecht Report, 2014.  
Pedone, Luiz. Science, technology and innovation for defense in Brazil- An Analysis of the Transfer of Technology and 
Challenges of Brazilian Defense Porgrams. 
 




            
Table 5 -  Expected Employment Generation, 2014 







Construction of  S-BR 2,000 8,000 
Project SN-BR + Navy 
Nuclear Program 
2,150 n.a. 
Construction of SN-BR 1,500 6,000 
From: Fleet Admiral Hirschfeld presentation to the Commission of Foreign Relations and National 
Defense. Chamber of Deputies (6 August 2014).  
 
The total numbers for the Construction of UFEM / EBN complex were – 13,717 direct 
jobs and 6,469 indirect jobs – at the end of 2014.  However, budgetary problems are 
gradually increasing. There were 1,500 employees laid off recently in the past months of 
2015 in view of the reduction of 25% of the defense budget affecting directly the construction 
of the ECN (Estaleiro e Base Naval), postponing its final date by one year to October 2016.25 
 
State-Society fostering of democracy by defense modernization 
International Political Strategic Partnership – France-Brazil 
 
The most important achievements are results deriving from the Navy Nuclear Program. 
Brazil is the sole responsible party for the “design, construction and putting into operation 
of on-board nuclear reactor, the installations in the nuclear reactor compartment, and 
equipment and facilities whose functions are primarily concerned with the reactor´s 
                                                
25 http://www.naval.com.br/blog/2015/05/23/cortes-adiam-termino-do-estaleiro-de-construcao-de-submarinos-e-a-
reforma-do-a12/ . Access 20 June 2015. 
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operation safety.”26  This is connected to the complex question of nuclear fuel enrichment, 
to be provided by the LabGene Nuclear-Electric Generation Lab (Laboratório de Geração 
Nucleo-Elétrica – LABGENE ) and USEXA mentioned earlier. The prototype construction of 
the 48 MW-pressurized water reactors has already started, and will most likely use fuel 
enriched at a maximum level of 10%, subject to verification by the international agencies 
IAEA (International Atomic energy Agency) and ABACC (Argentina-Brazil Agency for 
Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials).  
 This process may entail a robust defense policy together with an independent and 
universal foreign policy, in the words of Amorim (2013). Essential for implementing these 
two state policies is the Defense Technological and Industrial Base Strategy of producing 
advanced defense material and focusing on high technology industry and permanent 
innovation.  
France is transferring technology to Brazil by means of structuring organizations and 
training technical staff to construct submarines. At the same time, this program increased 
France´s geopolitical influence in the South Atlantic area. France is also a South American 
country (French Guiana) bordering Brazil and Suriname. By this Strategic Agreement, Brazil 
will be the only non-nuclear power which will have the capacity to build submarines, as 
well as placing its defense industrial and technological base at a higher level than before. 
However, the geopolitical challenges concerning the South Atlantic are justified in view of 
new military alliances being formed, particularly with NATO over extending its limits to 
actions in an out-of-bounds region. For this matter, both diplomacy and defense should 
reinforce one another.  
 
Human Capital Science & Technology “software” transfer  
This is probably where the Brazilian Navy is most earnestly trying to obtain, absorb 
scientific and technological knowledge, and create an environment conducive to fostering 
the capabilities of generating new projects, all of this with the aim of increasing Brazil’s 
technological capacity.   
 This technology transference by acquisition of means for the Brazilian Navy 
(corvette, submarines) was impressive in the 1980s, when engineers and officers were 
capable of producing means for the Navy in Brazil. However, lack of continuity and 
                                                
26 Acordo entre o Governo da República Federativa do Brasil e o Governo da República Francesa na Área de 
Submarinos.  
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irregular financing placed a severe burden on the development of the frigate, corvette and 
submarines in the following 20 years.  In the French case, DCNS has a statute obligation to 
transfer knowledge; transfer information, technical assistance services and teach know why 
(Hirschfeld, 2014, p.13).  Three main ares of ToT on PROSUB:  i) learning by learning  and  
learning by doing processes – courses and on job training;  ii) processe of ToT for the 
development of productive infrastructures (UFEM / EBN) and governance instituitions; iii) 
processes involving ToT of foreign companies to National enterprises, directly related to 
Offset 3 – Nationalization of PROSUB with expected resources of  €1 billion for the 
production of parts, machines, equipment and systems (electric, electronic, arms, 
propulsion, etc).   
  
Table 6 A– Summary of Human Capital Technology Transfer on PROSUB 
Contract Blueprints and 
Engineering 
Specifications 
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From: Serviço de Informação ao Cidadão da Marinha do Brasil ( Pedido de Informação NUP 60502.00698/2015-
29 ) – Resumo do Processo de ToT, 8 páginas.  Also Hirschfeld, 2014.  
 
 
Table 6 B   – Summary of Human Capital Technology Transfer on PROSUB (Continued) 








Results Intended and 
Preliminary 
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EBN (Estaleiro de 
Construção e 
Manutenção e 
Base Naval) - 
Shipyard 
 
UFEM –  
254 groups of 
documents for civil 
engineering project 




EBN –  
175 group of 
documents for civil 
engineering project 




Furnished by DCNS 
  UFEM inaugurated in 
March 2013 
More than 600 national 
enterprises involved. 
One hundred and ninety 
companies with 90% 
nationalization index on 
providng services, raw 
materials, and 
equipment.  
From: Serviço de Informação ao Cidadão da Marinha do Brasil ( Pedido de Informação NUP 60502.00698/2015-




Embraer was a public enterprise until the early 1990s, when it was privatized. It developed 
a number of military small training and specific purpose airplanes until its association with 
Italian Aeromacchi, AerItalia for developing the A1 subsonic fighter (243 manufactured for 
the Italian and the Brazilian Air Force). This meant a significant technological leap which 
enabled its spinoff into civilian regional airplanes production, with a worldwide market. 
Later it improved military planes (SuperTucano) and recently developed a medium size 
Carrier, the KC390, under production. Being the major company in Brazil associated to the 
production of the fighters, Embraer onwership is distributed in the following markets: a 
Golden Share by the Brazilian Federal Government, and 740 million shares of common stock 
shares, with the largest shareholders depicted in the graph below. It is important to note 
that shares are traded at two large stock exchange markets, New York and São Paulo. 
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EMBRAER OWNERSHIP, 2014 
 
 
Source: Relação com os investidores.   
http://ri.embraer.com.br/show.aspx?idCanal=ltPlKaoPDWiQ1uj7aoUw6Q== . Access August 2015 
 
Table 7 – Embraer Equity Distribution, 2014 (%) 




BNDES PAR 5.37 
Previ - Bank of Brazil Pension 
Fund 
6.71 
Oppenheimer Funds INC  12.29 
Baillie Gilford & Co.   6.46 
Total 30.83 
Other investors include: 
Bozano Group Sistel Pension 
Fund (Telecommunication 
Brandes Investment Partners, 
LP Barrow Hanley, 
MeWhinney& Strauss LLC,  






Public Stock Trade 








  Sources: Embraer reports 
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“Nationalization of Defense Production” and the Question of Brazilian Enterprise 
 
A great number of the firms participating in the Gripen NG BR Program are foreign 
companies acting through their subsidiaries established in Brazil. According to the law, 
these are admitted as Brazilian companies even if capital and stockholders are foreign.  The 
only requirement is to be incorporated in Brazil and have its management headquarters in 
the country.  
The Constitutional Amendment n. 6 (1995) revoked the constitutional precept of 
Article 171 distinguishing Brazilian companies of foreign capital and of national capital, 
meant to classify Brazilian companies by their effective control on residents of Brazil.  
This poses a number of questions and challenges, since the foreign partners may 
define objectives very differently from what is stated in the National Strategy of Defense. A 
subsidiary Brazilian company owns property over the technology inherent to its products 
and its partners, independently of their nationality, and may decide where to invest and in 
what.  
For that matter, when one thinks of “nationalization of defense products” as being a 
factor which guarantees sovereignty, progress and gradual independence/autonomy on 
production of defense equipment and the elimination of the distinction between the two 
kinds of companies does not help. Nevertheless, industrial learning processes from the 
Gripen Program will certainly occur. 
An important contribution to this challenge was the enactment of the Law 
12.598/2012 (BRASIL, 2012), after the Provisional Measure MP 544/2011 warranted  the right 
to postulate special financing regimes, fiscal and other incentives to those companies 
yielding the national interest in “defense products, strategic defense products, and defense 
systems” as well as the development of national technologies.  
Thus, the Law 12598 defines a “Strategic Defense Enterprise” as that which has the objective 
of realizing “research, project, development, industrialization, service rendering” to defense 
products and defense technology.  Furthermore, a Strategic Defense Enterprise must have 
in Brazil its management headquarters and industrial plants, and to have proven to have its 
own scientific and technological knowledge or cooperation agreements with Science & 
Technology Institutions of R&D for defense products. Most importantly, article 2, item IV, 
line d states that a Strategic Defense Enterprise must assure that the set of foreign partners 
or shareholders and foreign groups of partners or shareholders cannot have more than 2/3 
of the total votes which can be made by Brazilian shareholders present in the company´s 
general meeting of shareholders. This condition allows a 33.34% voice to express national 
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Brazilian partners and shareholders in decisions taken in the enterprise, which hardly is 
enough.  
 
Economic Crisis and the Brazilian Air Force Gripen NG BR Program and PROSUB 
The development of the Gripen Program is suffering delays in the chronogram in view of 
the budgetary cuts affecting defense programs in general. The total costs were $ 5.4 billion 
dollars (equivalent to BRL$ 12 billion in July 2014, but BRL$ 17.5 billion July 2015, one year 
later). The Brazilian Government renegotiated the interest rate with the Swedish Export 
Credit Corporation (SEK) set initially at 2.54%. In July 2015, SEK approved a reduction to 
2.19% annually for the financing of 100% of the project, set at $4.7 billion dollars ($39 billion 
Swedish Kronas). Certainly, the increase of exchange rate by more than 40% in the last 12 
months (July 2014-July 2015) and the budgetary cuts will affect this Project, as well as other 
Air Force projects. 27 
Notwithstanding the importance of these economic-financial facts, the differential is 
technological autonomy provided by this Gripen NG BR Program placing Brazil in the Flow 
C pattern of Table 1.  
 
7. Final Considerations  
This paper had the general objective of analyzing outputs and intended or actual first 
outcomes of major strategic defense projects in Brazil, specifically with respect to ToT. 
Identifying two major defense products acquisitions programs and correspondent ToT 
activities (Gripen NG BR Program and PROSUB) we observed the five dimensions: 
 
- Technology itself – “hardware” 
- Economic development regional/ national 
- State-Society fostering of democracy by defense modernization 
- International Political Strategic Partnership 
- Human Capital Science & Technology “software” transfer. 
 
                                                
27 Tania Monteiro – O Estado de São Paulo (29 July 2015) -  http://politica.estadao.com.br/noticias/geral,brasil-sela-
acordo-com-suecia-para-financiamento-de-cacas,1734472.    Access 28 August 2015.  
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It should be remembered that military production in Brazil has had its ups and 
downs. While it grew during the 1970s and 1980s, it was almost annihilated after the end of 
Iran-Iraq War. There was a new spurt of growth in the 2000s, but it is now declining again, 
according to SIPRI statistics (2013).   
 We have seen many documents, policies and strategies about modernization of 
means in the Brazilian Armed Forces, with ambitious acquisition and transfer of technology 
programs. Although we pointed at intended outcomes, many of them already accomplished 
successfully as, for example, UFEM and EBN, Navy Nuclear Program, the initial intended 
investment in SBTA Sao Bernardo Tecnologia Aeroespacial, most of them are still in the 
words of the contracts signed in both large -scale programs. 
 Many challenges remain. Implementation problems mount, from finances to politics, 
from science & technology limitations, and from managerial to governance institutional 
deficits. The current financial crisis is certainly putting a burden on budgets for the next 
three years to come (2016-2017-2018).  Many deadlines were postponed already. The 
planned transformation of the defense and technological and industrial base is contingent 
on the continuity of high levels of military spending, which is jeopardized by the 75% sum 
spent on personnel payment, leaving little room for investment and R&D.  
 Science, Technology and Innovation has historically received little priority in 
Brazilian public policy, except for a few sectors of excellence (agriculture, for example). 
Defense ST&I has only recently received partial support from politicians and budgetary 
allocations, but this has been too little, too late. Except for groups in military and Research 
Centers, priority is low. This gets worse on account of feeble support for defense on the part 
of society, as recent surveys done by IPEA show. (IPEA- Sistema de Indicadores de 
Percepção Social – Defesa Nacional, 2012). 
 Another problem calls for the lack of commitment of the elites—from the state or 
private sector—on the development of military production, different from countries where 
military preparedness for geopolitical reasons is important, as in China and India, as put 
forth by Lucena Silva in his recent PhD dissertation on military globalization and the 
international military order. 28  
                                                
28 LUCENA SILVA, Antonio Henrique - Globalização Militar e a Ordem Militar Internacional: comparando as 
indústrias de defesa dos BRICS (Brasil, Rússia, Índia, China e África do Sul). PhD Politcal Science. Universidade 
Federal Fluminense, 2015. 
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Even if large private sector companies from the heavy civil construction and Oil and 
Gás sector have opened Defense branches this does not follow a rationale of strengthening 
the national industrial base.29 (PACHECO RAMOS, mimeo 2015)   
Nor is there an industrial policy conducive to investments in defense. Their motive 
seems to be more connected to fiscal and financial incentives which made it more attractive 
to enter this industrial sector. The increasing defense expenditures turned the sector 
attractive just as the prospects for productivity gains from transfer of technology through 
partnerships with foreign companies (EMBRAER-SAAB, DCNS-Odebrecht Defesa, etc.) 
A number of problems were put forth by Lucena Silva (op.cit) for the Brazilian 
defense strategy. Even if there are incentives for an increase in military spending three other 
factors are not present:  a) a correspondent expansion of the Defense Industrial Base; b) 
sustained procurement for national military products; c) a reduction of dependence for 
military means on foreign countries - Core Competencies; and d) reduction of international 
restrictions on technology – Sanctions.   
Most importantly only a small number of groups (the military is one of them) have a 
long-term development project for the country with a military-strategic dimension. 
Politicians and bureaucrats, industrial and financial decision-making elites have yet to make 
a clear long-term commitment. The country resents it.  
All these major projects have a significant political impact in Brazilian international 
insertion.  Brazil is known by its high soft power, or the capacity to negotiate and influence 
in international affairs.  These projects are meant to increase Brazilian hard power capacity, 
fundamental if the country wishes to have a higher place in the international system.  
Strategic partnership agreements with European countries such as France and 
Sweden (and Italy) are part of a deliberate policy of seeking autonomous, independent 
development by diversifying partnerships particularly in Science and Technology aspects.   
This preliminary study shows the needs for the continuity and deepening of research, 
and budgetary funds for implementation phase of the strategic projects, particularly in the 
ToT features. The facts and analyses presented are insufficient to fully evaluate the crucial 
component of the strategic projects. They specifically focus in the capacitating in design, 
R&D, and industrial productive capabilities which would allow autonomous conception, 
                                                
29 Thiago Pacheco Ramos. O Impacto dos Incentivos na Expansão e Declínio da indústria de Defesa Brasileira: o caso 
da inserção de grandes conglomerados. Monograph International Relations - UFF, 2016.  
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development and production of defense systems. So far, we have more questions than 
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